In this paper we discuss the semantics and properties of the relative belief transform, a probability transformation of belief functions closely related to the classical plausibility transform. We discuss its rationale in both the probability-bound and Shafer's interpretations of belief functions. Even though the resulting probability (as it is the case for the plausibility transform) is not consistent with the original belief function, an interesting rationale in terms of optimal strategies in a non-cooperative game can be given in the probability-bound interpretation to both relative belief and plausibility of singletons. On the other hand, we prove that relative belief commutes with Dempster's orthogonal sum, meets a number of properties which are the duals of those met by the relative plausibility of singletons, and commutes with convex closure in a similar way to Dempster's rule. This supports the argument that relative plausibility and belief transform are indeed naturally associated with the D-S framework, and highlights a classification of probability transformations in two families, according to the operator they relate to. Finally, we point out that relative belief is only a member of a class of "relative mass" mappings, which can be interpreted as low-cost proxies for both plausibility and pignistic transforms.
Introduction
The theory of evidence (ToE) [38] extends classical probability theory through the notion of belief function (b.f.), a mathematical entity which independently assigns probability values to sets of possibilities rather than single 
b(B).
Special belief functions assigning non-zero masses to singletons only (m b (A) = 0 whenever |A| > 1, A ⊆ Θ) are called Bayesian b.f.s, and are in 1-1 correspondence with probability distributions on Θ. Different operators have been proposed for the combination of two or more belief functions, starting from the orthogonal sum originally formulated by A. Dempster [19, 18] . Belief functions possess a number of alternative semantics in terms of multivalued mappings [40] , random sets [35, 29] , inner measures [36, 26] , transferable beliefs [45] or hints [32] . One such interpretation is based on the fact that a belief function corresponds to a set of upper and lower bounds to the values of probability measures on Θ, which in turn determine a convex set P [b] of such probabilities (often called consistent with b):
where the plausibility function pl b : 2
B∩A =∅ m b (B) carries the same evidence as b. Such interpretation has been criticized as incompatible with Dempster's rule of combination [52] .
Probability transformation of belief functions
Nevertheless, the relation between belief and probability in the theory of evidence has been an important subject of study. Given a frame of discernment Θ, let us denote by B the set of all belief functions on Θ, and by P the set of all probability measures on Θ. According to [17] , we call a probability transform of belief functions an operator pt : 
. Note that such definition requires the probability which results from the transform to be compatible with the upper and lower bounds the original b.f. b enforces on the singletons only, and not on all the focal sets as in Equation (1) . This is a minimal, sensible constraint which does not require probability transforms to adhere to the upper-lower probability semantics of belief functions. As a matter of fact, important such transforms are not compatible with such semantics, as we will see here. A number of papers have been published on the issue of probability transform [53, 33, 1, 55, 22, 23, 28] . Many of these proposals seek efficient implementations of the rule of combination. Tessem [49] , for instance, incorporates only the highest-valued focal elements in his m klx approximation. A similar approach inspires the summarization technique formulated by Lowrance et al. [34] . A different, decision based approach to probability transformation is the foundation of Smets' "Transferable Belief Model" [42, 45] . In the original model in which b.f.s are induced by multi-valued mappings of probability distributions, Dempster's conditioning can be judged inappropriate from a Bayesian point of view. In order to deal with such criticism, Smets abandons all notions of multivalued mapping to define belief directly in terms of basis belief assignments ("credal" level), while decisions are made via the pignistic probability
generated by what he calls the pignistic transform: BetP : B → P, b → BetP [b] . Initially justified by the Principle of Insufficient Reason, the pignistic probability is the result of a redistribution process in which the mass of each focal element A is re-assigned to all its elements x ∈ A on an equal basis, and is perfectly compatible with the upper-lower probability semantics of b.f.s, as it is the center of mass of the polytope (1) of consistent probabilities [4] . Other proposals have been recently brought forward by Dezert et al. [24] , Burger [3] , Sudano [48] and others, based on redistribution processes similar to that of the pignistic transform. In addition, two new Bayesian approximations of belief functions have been derived from purely geometric considerations [9] in the context of the geometric approach to the ToE [11] , in which belief and probability measures are represented as points of a Cartesian space.
Relative plausibility and belief transforms
Originally developed by Voorbraak [51] as a probabilistic approximation intended to limit the computational cost of operating with belief functions in the Dempster-Shafer framework, the plausibility transform [5] has later been supported by Cobb 
We call the outputpl b (3) of the plausibility transform relative plausibility of singletons (r.pl.s.). Voorbraak proved that his (in our terminology) relative plausibility of singletonspl b is a perfect representative of b when combined with other probabilities p ∈ P through Dempster's rule ⊕: [10, 13, 27, 17] b
can be defined. Unlike the relative plausibility of singletons, however,b[b] exists iff b assigns some mass to singleton focal sets:
The notion of relative belief transform (under the name of normalized belief of singletons) has first been proposed by Daniel [17] . Some preliminary analyses of the relative belief transform and its close relationship with the (relative) plausibility transform have been presented in [10, 13] . Whatever the rationale for proposing a probability transformation of belief functions (decision making, as in the pignistic transform, or computational burden in many other cases), there are many ways of investigating its design: geometrical properties, principle of insufficient reason, commutativity properties, etcetera. A detailed discussion of the geometrical properties ofb andpl, for instance, has been given in [14] . Here we focus on commutativity properties, making a distinction between transforms which commute with respect to affine combination of b.f.s (pignistic and orthogonal probabilities), and those which commute with respect to Dempster's rule (and therefore are consistent with the original Dempster-Shafer framework): relative plausibility and belief transform. This outlines a classification of probability transformations into two classes, according to the operator they commute with.
Paper contribution and outline
As belief functions have different, rather conflicting interpretations, in Section 2 we discuss the semantics of both relative belief and plausibility in the probability-bound and Shafer's interpretation of the theory. Within the probability-bound interpretation (Section 2.1), as neither transforms are associated with a valid redistribution of the mass of the focal elements to the singletons, it is easy to prove that they are not consistent with the original belief function. However, an interesting betting semantics for such transforms in this interpretation can be provided in an adversarial game theory scenario [50] in which an opponent is free to pick any probability function in the set determined by a belief function, and the decision maker goal is to minimize their minimal reward (or minimize their maximal loss). In Shafer's formulation of the theory of evidence as an evidence combination process, arguments similar to those formulated for the plausibility transform can be resorted to in the case of the relative belief transform (Section 2.2). Indeed, we argue here the relative plausibility and belief transform are closely related probability transformations (Section 3). Not only they are characterized by the fact that the relative belief of singletons can be seen as the relative plausibility of singletons of the associated plausibility function (Section 3.2), but both transforms meet a number of dual properties with respect to Dempster's rule of combination (Section 3.3). In particular, whilepl b commutes with Dempster's sum of belief functions,b commutes with orthogonal sums of plausibility functions. Similarly, whilepl b perfectly represents the belief function b when combined with any probability distribution (4),b perfectly represents the associated plausibility function pl b when combined with a probability through the natural extension of Dempster's sum (Section 3.4). Such a duality is illustrated in the following table:
This outlines the classification of probability transformations into two major classes: those commuting with affine combination against those commuting with Dempster's rule (Section 3.5). The behavior of the plausibility transform w.r.t. affine combination, closely mimicking that of Dempster's rule itself, confirms that this second family is indeed more consistent with the original Dempster-Shafer framework. The symmetry/duality between (relative) plausibility and belief is broken, however, as the existence of r.b.s. is subject to a strong condition (6), stressing the issue of its applicability (Section 4). Even though this situation is "singular" (in the sense that it excludes most belief and probability measures, Section 4.1), in practice the situation in which the mass of all singletons is nil is common. However, in Section 4.2 we point out that relative belief is only a member of a class of relative mass transformations, which can be interpreted as low-cost proxies for both plausibility and pignistic transforms (4.3). We discuss their applicability as approximate transformations in two significant scenarios.
2 Rationale of relative belief and plausibility of singletons in two interpretations of the theory of evidence
The original semantics of belief functions derive from Dempster's analysis of the effect of multi-valued mappings Γ : Ω → 2 Θ , x ∈ Ω → Γ(x) ⊆ Θ on evidence available in the form of a probability distribution on the "top" domain Ω on the "bottom" decision set Θ. As such, belief values are probabilities of events implying other events. In some of his papers [20] , however, Dempster himself claimed that the mass m b (A) associated with a non-singleton event A ⊆ Θ could be understood as a "floating probability mass" which could not be attached to any particular singleton event x ∈ A because of the lack of precision of the (multi-valued) operator that quantify our knowledge via the mass function. This has originated a popular but controversial interpretation of belief functions as coherent sets of probabilities determined by sets of lower and upper bounds on their probability values. As Shafer admits in [?] , there is a sense in which a single belief function can indeed be interpreted as a consistent system of probability bounds. However, the issue with the probability-bound interpretation of belief functions becomes evident when considering two or more belief functions addressing the same question but representing conflicting items of evidence, i.e., when Dempster's rule is applied to aggregate evidence. In [38, 39] , Shafer disavowed any probability-bound interpretation, a position later seconded by Dempster [21] . We will come back to this point in Section 2.2, in which we will link the relative belief transform to Cobb and Shenoy's arguments [5] in favor of the plausibility transform as a link between Shafer's theory of evidence (endowed with Dempster's rule) and Bayesian reasoning. To corroborate this argument, in Section 2.1 we show that both plausibility and relative belief transforms (unlike Smets' pignistic transform) are not consistent with a probability-bound interpretation of belief functions. Even in this interpretation, however, a rationale for such transformations can be given via a utility theoretical argument as in the case of the pignistic probability.
Semantics within the probability bound interpretation
In their static, probability-bound interpretation, belief functions b : 2
of "consistent" probability distributions (1) . It can be proven that a probability distribution on Θ is consistent with b in the above way iff it is the result of a redistribution process, in which the mass of each focal element is shared between its elements in an arbitrary proportion [12] . One such probability is central in Smets' Transferable Belief Model, in which decisions are made at the pignistic level by applying a pignistic trans-form to convert the available belief function into a probability distribution. The nature of the mapping was originally based on the Principle of Insufficient Reason (PIR) proposed by Bernoulli, Laplace, and Keynes [9] , which states that "if there is no known reason for predicating of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability". A direct consequence of the PIR 2 in the probability-bound interpretation of b.f.s is that, when considering how to redistribute the mass of an event A, it is wise to assume equiprobability amongst its singletons: but this yields exactly the pignistic transform (2).
Inconsistence of relative belief and plausibility of singletons
It is easy to prove that relative belief and plausibility of singletons are not the result of such a redistribution process, and therefore are not consistent with the original b.f. in the sense defined above. Indeed, the relative plausibility of singletons (3) is the result of a process in which:
• for each singleton x ∈ Θ a redistribution process (there could be more than one) is selected in which the mass of all the events containing it is reassigned to x, yielding {pl b (x), x ∈ Θ}; • however, as different redistribution processes are supposed to hold for different singletons (many of which belong to the same higher-size focal elements), this scenario is not compatible with the existence of a single redistribution of mass to the singletons, as the mass of the same higher cardinality event is assigned to different singletons; • the obtained plausibility values pl b (x) are nevertheless normalized to yield a formally admissible probability distribution.
Similarly, for the relative belief of singletons (5):
• for each singleton x ∈ Θ a redistribution process is selected in which only the mass of {x} itself is re-assigned to x, yielding {b(x) = m b (x), x ∈ Θ}; • once again this scenario does not correspond to a single valid redistribution process, as the mass of all higher-size focal elements is not assigned to any singletons; • the obtained values b(x) are nevertheless normalized to produce a valid probability.
The fact that both such probability transformations derive from assuming together a number of incompatible redistribution processes is reflected by the fact that the resulting probability distributions are not guaranteed to belong to the set of probabilities (1) consistent with b.
Theorem 1 The relative belief of singletons is not always consistent.
Proof. We just need a simple counterexample. Consider a belief function b : 2
Forb to be consistent with b (Equation (1)) it is necessary thatb(
is not a probability) its relative belief of singletons is not consistent. 2
A similar counterexample can be found forpl b .
Theorem 2 The relative plausibility of singletons is not always consistent.
Proof. Let us pick for simplicity a frame of discernment with just three elements: Θ = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }, and the following b.b.a.:
In this case, the plausibility of {x 1 , x 2 } is obviously:
while the plausibilities of the singletons are:
. Finally, forpl b to be consistent with b we need that:
which happens if and only if
As an additional example, consider a belief function on Θ = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n } with two focal elements:
This can be interpreted as the following real-world situation. A number of people x 2 , ..., x n have no money of their own but they are all candidates to inherit the wealth of a very rich relative. Person x 1 is not, but has some little money of their own. Note that it is not correct to interpret x 2 , ..., x n as assured, joint owners of a certain wealth (say, shares of the same company), as (7) is indeed consistent (in the probability-bound interpretation) with a distribution which assigns probability 0.99 to a single person of the group x 2 , ..., x n . The relative belief of singletons associated with (7) is the distribution with
Clearly this is not a good representative of the set of probabilities consistent with the above belief function, as it does not contemplate at all the chance the heirs x 2 , ..., x n have to gain a remarkable amount of money. Indeed, according to Theorem 1,b in this example is not at all consistent with (7).
A game/utility theory interpretation
Whatb andpl b (or better, their un-normalized versions) do is to set respectively a lower and an upper bound to the probability values for each element x ∈ Θ of the frame under the constraint represented by the belief function b, as in Dempster's original interpretation. However, even though in the probability-bound interpretation the two transforms do not appear as valid approximations of belief functions, an interesting interpretation for them can be provided in a game/utility theory context [50, 46, 30] . The argument we propose here recalls somehow the betting rationale for the pignistic transform in the TBM [54] , where a MAP decision is taken at the pignistic level as follows:
In expected utility theory [50] , a decision maker can choose between a number of "lotteries" (probability distributions) L i in order to maximize their expected return or utility calculated as
where u is a utility function u : Θ → R + which measures the relative satisfaction (for us) of the different outcomes x ∈ Θ of the lottery, and p i (x) is the probability of x under lottery L i .
Consider instead the following game theory scenario, inspired by Strat's expected utility approach to decision making with belief functions [47, 37] . In a country fair, people are asked to bet on one of the possible outcomes of a spinning carnival wheel. Suppose the outcomes are {♣, ♦, ♥, ♠}, and that they each have the same utility (return) to the player. This is equivalent to a lottery (probability distribution), in which each outcome has a probability proportional to the area of the corresponding sectors on the wheel. However, the fair manager decides to make the game more interesting by covering part of the wheel. Players are still asked to bet on a single outcome, knowing that the manager is allowed to rearrange the hidden sector of the wheel as he pleases (see Figure 1 ). Clearly, this situation can be described as a belief function, in particular one in which the fraction of area associated with the hidden sector is assigned as mass to the whole decision space {♣, ♦, ♥, ♠}. If additional (partial) information is provided, for instance that ♦ cannot appear in the hidden sector, different belief functions must be chosen instead.
Regardless the particular belief function b (set of probabilities) at hand, the rule allowing the manager to pick an arbitrary distribution of outcomes in the hidden section mathematically translates into allowing him/her to choose any probability distribution p ∈ P[b] consistent with b in order to damage the player. Supposing the aim of the player is to maximize their minimal chance of winning the bet, which outcome (singleton) should they pick? In the probability-bound interpretation, the belief value of each singleton x ∈ Θ measures the minimal support x can receive from a distribution of the family associated with the belief function b:
is the outcome which maximizes such minimal support. In the example of Figure 1 , as ♣ is the outcome which occupies the largest share of the visible part of the wheel, the safest bet (the one which guarantees the maximal chance in the worst case) is indeed ♣. In a more formal language, ♣ is the singleton with the largest belief value. Now, if we normalize to compute the r.b.s. this outcome is obviously conserved:
In conclusion, if the utility function is constant (i.e., no element of Θ can be preferred over the others), x maximin (the peak(s) of the relative belief of singletons) represents the best possible defensive strategy aimed at maximizing the minimal utility of the possible outcomes.
Dually, pl b (x) measures the maximal possible support to x by a distribution consistent with b, so that
is the outcome which minimizes the maximal possible support. Suppose for sake of simplicity that the loss function l : Θ → R + which measures the relative dissatisfaction of the outcomes is constant, and that in the same game theory setup our opponent is (again) free to pick a consistent probability distribution p ∈ P [b] . Then the element with minimal relative plausibility is the best possible defensive strategy aimed at minimizing the maximum possible loss. Note that when the utility function is not constant the above minimax and maximin problems naturally generalize as
While in classical utility theory the decision maker has to select the best "lottery" (probability distribution) in order to maximize the expected utility, here the "lottery" is chosen by his/her opponent (given the available partial evidence), and the decision maker is left with betting on the safest strategy (element of Θ). Relative belief and plausibility of singletons play a crucial role in determining the safest betting strategy in an adversarial scenario in which the decision maker has to minimize their maximal loss/maximize their minimal return.
Semantics within Shafer's interpretation
Shafer has strongly argued against a probability-bound interpretation of belief functions. When these are not taken in isolation but as pieces of evidence to combine, such an interpretation forces us to consider only groups of belief functions whose degrees of belief, when interpreted as probability bounds, can be satisfied simultaneously (in other words, when their sets of consistent probabilities have non-empty intersection). In Shafer's (and Shenoy's) view, though, when belief functions are combined via Dempster's rule this is irrelevant, even though consistent probabilities that simultaneously bound all the belief functions being combined as well as the resulting b.f. do exist when no renormalization is required in their Dempster's combination. Consequently, citing Shafer, authors who support a probability-bound interpretation of belief functions are uncomfortable with renormalization [56] . In this context, Cobb and Shenoy [5] have argued in favor of the plausibility transform as a link between Shafer's theory of evidence (endowed with Dempster's rule) and Bayesian reasoning. Besides some general arguments supporting probability transformations of belief functions in general, their points more specifically about the plausibility transform can be summarized as follows:
• a probability transformation consistent with Dempster's rule can improve our understanding of the theory of evidence by providing probabilistic semantics for belief functions, i.e., "meanings" of basic probability assignments in the context of betting for hypotheses in the frame Θ; • in opposition to some literature on belief functions suggesting that the theory of evidence is more expressive than probability theory since the probability model obtained by using the pignistic transformation leads to nonintuitive results [2] , they show that by using the plausibility transformation method the original belief function model and the corresponding probability model yield the same qualitative results; • a probability transformation consistent with Dempster's rule allows to build probabilistic models by converting/transforming belief function models obtained by using the belief function semantics of distinct evidence [41] .
Mathematically, they proved [7] that the plausibility transform commutes with Dempster's rule, and meets a number of additional properties which they claim "allow an integration of Bayesian and D-S reasoning that takes advantage of the efficiency in computation and decision-making provided by Bayesian calculus while retaining the flexibility in modeling evidence that underlies D-S reasoning". In this paper we prove that a similar set of (dual) properties hold for the relative belief transform, associating relative belief and relative plausibility transforms in a family of probability transformations strongly related to Shafer's interpretation of the theory of evidence via Dempster's rule.
Duality
Relative belief and plausibility of singletons are, as we show here, linked by a form of duality, asb can be interpreted as the relative plausibility of singletons of the plausibility function pl b associated with b. Furthermore,b andpl b share a close relationship with Dempster's evidence combination rule ⊕, as they meet a set of dual properties with respect to ⊕. This suggests a classification of all the probability transformations of belief functions in terms of the operator they relate to.
Relative plausibility, Dempster's rule, and pseudo belief functions

Definition 1
The orthogonal sum or Dempster's sum of two belief functions
where
We denote by k(b 1 , b 2 ) the denominator of Equation (8).
Cobb and Shenoy [7] proved that the relative plausibility functionpl b commutes with Dempster's rule, and meets a number of additional properties 
On his side, Voorbraak has shown [51] that: Proposition 2 The relative plausibility of singletonspl b is a perfect representative of b in the probability space when combined through Dempster's rule:
The relative belief of singletons meets analogous dual properties. Their study requires first to extend our analysis to a more general class of objects. Sum 
A (broken) symmetry
A direct consequence of the duality between belief and plausibility measures is the existence of a striking symmetry between (relative) plausibility and belief transform. A formal proof of this symmetry is based on the following interesting property of the basic plausibility assignment µ b [15] . 
The symmetry between r.pl.s. and r.b.s. is broken by the fact that the relative belief of singletons is not defined for belief functions with no singleton focal sets. Sinceb is itself an instance of relative plausibility (of a plausibility function pl b ), andpl b always exists, this fact seems to contradict Theorem 3. This superficial paradox finds an explanation in the combinatorial nature of belief, plausibility, and commonality functions. As we proved in [15] , while belief measures are sum functions of the form b(A) = B⊂A m(B) whose Moebius transform m is both normalized and non-negative, plausibility measures are sum functions whose Moebius transform µ is not necessarily non-negative (while commonality functions are not even normalized). As a consequence, the quantity
can be equal to zero, in which casepl pl b =b does not exist.
Dual properties of the relative belief operator
The duality betweenb andpl b (albeit imperfect to some extent) extends to the transformations' behavior with respect to Dempster's rule of combination (8) .
We first need to note that the orthogonal sum can be naturally extended to a pair ς 1 , ς 2 of pseudo belief functions too [16] , by applying (8) to their Moebius inverses m ς 1 , m ς 2 .
Proposition 3 Dempster's rule defined as in Equation (8) when applied to a pair of pseudo belief functions ς 1 , ς 2 yields again a pseudo belief function.
We still denote the orthogonal sum of two p.b.f.s ς 1 , ς 2 by ς 1 ⊕ ς 2 . As plausibility functions are pseudo b.f.s, Dempster's rule can then be formally applied to them too. We can then prove a dual commutativity result for relative beliefs. For this purpose, it is convenient to introduce a dual form of the relative belief operator, mapping a plausibility function to the corresponding relative belief of singletons:b : Proof. The basic plausibility assignment of pl 1 ⊕ pl 2 is, according to (8) ,
Therefore, according to Lemma 1, the corresponding relative belief of singletonsb[pl 1 ⊕ pl 2 ](x) (12) is proportional to
where m pl 1 ⊕pl 2 (x) denotes the b.p.a. of the (pseudo) b.f. which corresponds to the pl.f. pl 1 ⊕ pl 2 . On the other hand, as
Their Dempster's combination is therefore
and by normalizing we get (13). 2 Theorem 4 implies thatb
As an immediate consequence, an idempotence property which is the dual of point 2) of Proposition 1 holds for the relative belief of singletons.
Corollary 1 If pl b is idempotent with respect to Dempster's rule, i.e. pl b ⊕
The dual results of the remaining two statements of Proposition 1 can be proven in a similar fashion.
Proof. Taking the limit on both sides of Equation (14) we get
Let us consider the quantity (
n (where K is a constant independent from x), and x is the unique most believed state, it follows that
Hence by (15) 
An similar proof can be provided for the following generalization of Th 5.
, theñ
Example
It is crucial to point out that commutativity (Theorem 4) and idempotence (Corollary 1) hold for combinations of plausibility functions, and not of belief functions. Let us consider as an example the belief function b on the frame of size four Θ = {x, y, z, w} determined by the following basic probability assignment:
Its b.pl.a. is, according to (10), given by
To 
= lim n→∞ 0 = 0 in perfect agreement with Theorem 5.
Representation theorem for relative beliefs
A dual of the representation theorem (Proposition 2) for the relative belief transform can also be proven, once we recall a useful result on Dempster's sum of affine combinations [16] . 
Theorem 6 The relative belief of singletonsb represents perfectly the corresponding plausibility function pl b when combined with any probability through (extended) Dempster's rule:b
Proof. In virtue of Equation (11) we can express a plausibility function as an affine combination of all the categorical b.f.s b A . We can then apply the commutativity property (19) , obtaining
Once replaced these expressions in (20) we get:
, 
Example: continued
Once again, the representation theorem 6 is about combinations of plausibility functions (as pseudo b.f.s) and not combinations of belief functions. Going back to the previous example, the combination b ⊕ b of b with itself has b.p.a. 
Two families of Bayesian approximations
The following table summarizes the duality results we just presented:
Note that, just as Voorbraak's and Cobb's results are not valid for all pseudo belief functions but only for proper b.f.s., the above dual results do not hold for all pseudo belief functions either, but only for those p.b.f.s which are plausibility functions. These results bring about a subdivision of all probability transformations in two families, related to Dempster's sum and affine combination respectively. Once we recall that [9] Proposition 5 Both pignistic
commute with respect to affine combination:
we realize that we can in fact distinguish two families of Bayesian approximations, determined by their behavior with respect to two operators acting on belief functions. Namely, affine combination (in the space of belief functions) and Dempster's rule [38, 19, 18] .
The notion that there exist two distinct families of probability transformations, each determined by the operator they commute with, was already implicitly present in the literature. Smets' linearity axiom [45] , which lays at the foundation of the pignistic transform, obviously corresponds (even though expressed in a somewhat different language) to the commutativity with affine combination of belief functions. To address the criticism such axiom was subject to, Smets introduced later its formal justification based on an expected utility argument in the presence of conditional evidence [43] . On the other hand, Cobb and Shenoy defended the commutativity with respect of Dempster's rule, on the basis that the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is a coherent framework of which Dempster's rule is an integral part, and that a Dempster-compatible transformation can provide a useful probabilistic semantic for belief functions.
Incidentally, there seems to be a flaw in Smets' argument that the pignistic transform is uniquely determined as the probability transformation which commutes with affine combination: in [9] we indeed proved that the orthogonal transform (21) also enjoys the same property. Analogously, we showed here that the plausibility transform is not unique as a probability transformation which commutes with ⊕ (even though, in this latter case, the transformation is applied to different objects).
We add a further element to this debate here, by proving that the plausibility transform, even though it does not obviously commute with affine combination, does commute with the convex closure (22) of belief functions in the belief space B:
The two facts are not in contradiction: as a matter of fact, the behavior of the plausibility transform in this respect reflects a similar behavior of Dempster's rule (proved in [16] ), supporting the argument that the plausibility transform is indeed naturally associated with the D-S framework. Let us first understand its behavior w.r.t. affine combination.
Lemma 2 For all α ∈ R we have that
Proof. We first need to analyze the behavior of the plausibility transform with respect to affine combination of belief functions. By definition, the plausibility values of the affine combination
Hence, after denoting by k pl i = y∈Θ pl i (y) the total plausibility of the singletons w.r.t. b i , the values of the relative plausibility of singletons can be computed as:
Theorem 7
The relative plausibility operator commutes with convex closure in the belief space:
Proof. The proof follows the structure of that of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 in [16] , on the commutativity of Dempster's rule and convex closure. Formally, we need to prove that
(1) follows directly from Lemma 2.
(2) instead is equivalent to prove that there exist α k ≥ 0, k α k = 1 such that
which is equivalent to (23) is met: by further normalization we obtain as desired. 2
Generalizations of the relative belief operator
A serious issue with the relative belief of singletons is its applicability. In opposition to relative plausibility,b does not exist for a large class of belief functions (those which assign no mass to singletons). Even though this singular case involves only a small fraction of all belief measures (Section 4.1), this issue arises in many practical cases, for instance when we use fuzzy membership functions to model the evidence.
Zero mass to singletons as a singular case
In the binary case Θ = {x, y}, according to (6) the only b.f. which does not admit r.b.s. is the vacuous one Theorem 7 proves that the plausibility transform commutes with convex closure (22) . As (by Proposition 4, [9] ) the pignistic transform (2) commutes with affine combination, we have that BetP also commutes with Cl: 
. Pignistic and relative plausibility transform span the whole probability simplex P. Consider, however, the set of (singular) b.f.s which assign zero mass to singletons. They live in Cl(b A , |A| > 1), as according to Equation (11) of P spanned by their probability transforms is thereforẽ
The result is illustrated by Figure 3 -right in the ternary case. If (6) is not met, both probability transformations span only a limited region
Cl(P {x,y} , P {x,z} , P {y,z} , P Θ ) = Cl(P {x,y} , P {x,z} , P {y,z} ) of the probability simplex (delimited by dashed lines).
The family of relative mass probability transformations
One may argue that even though the "singular" case concerns only a small fraction of all belief and probability measures, in many practical application there is a bias towards some particular models which are the most exposed to the problem. For example, uncertainty is commonly represented using a fuzzy membership function [31] . If the membership function has only a finite number of values, then it is equivalent to a belief function whose focal sets are linearly ordered under set inclusion [38, 25] . In consonant b.f.s at most one focal element A 1 is a singleton. So, the vast majority of the useful information in the b.p.a. is contained in the non-singleton focal elements.
Some reflection on the problem of the non-applicability of the relative belief of singletons in many meaningful cases leads to the realization that relative belief transformation is only a representative of an entire family of probability transformations. Indeed,b can be thought of as the probability transformation which, given a b.f. b:
(1) retains the focal elements of size 1 only, yielding an unnormalized belief function; (2) computes (indifferently) the latter's relative plausibility/pignistic transformation:
Following this scheme, a family of natural generalizations of the relative belief transform is obtained by, given an arbitrary b.f. b:
(1) retaining the focal elements of size s only; 
i.e., the same result. The following natural extension of the relative belief operator is then well defined. We denote bym s the output of the relative mass transform of level s.
Approximation of pignistic probability and relative plausibility 4.3.1 Classical transformations as convex combinations of relative mass transformations
It is easy too see that both relative plausibility of singletons and pignistic probability are convex combinations of all the (n) relative mass probabilities Therefore we obtain for the relative plausibility of singletons the following convex decomposition into relative mass probabilitiesm s
, with coefficients
measuring for each level s the total plausibility contribution of the focal elements of size s. In the case of the pignistic probability we get:
with coefficients β s = k b,s measuring for each level s the mass contribution of the focal elements of size s.
Relative mass transforms as low-cost proxies: approximation criteria
Accordingly, the relative mass probabilities can be seen as basic components of both the pignistic and the plausibility transform, associated with the evidence carried by focal elements of a specific size. As such transforms can be computed just by considering size-s focal elements, they can also be thought of as low-cost proxies for both relative plausibility and pignistic probability, since only the n s size-s focal elements (instead of the initial 2 n ) have to be stored, while all the others can be dropped without further processing.
We can think of two natural criteria for such an approximation ofpl, BetP via the relative mass transforms.
• (C1) we retain the component s whose coefficient α s /β s is the largest in the convex decomposition (25)/(26); • (C2) we retain the component associated with the minimal size focal elements.
Clearly, the relative belief transformation coincides with this second approximation if x m b (x) = 0. When the mass of singletons is nil, instead, the second criterion delivers a natural extension of the relative belief operator:
The two approximation criteria favor different aspects of the original belief function. (C1) focuses (in two different ways) on the strength of the evidence carried by focal elements of equal size. Note that the optimal C1 approximations of plausibility or pignistic transform are in principle quite distinct:
The best approximation for the pignistic probability will not necessarily be the best approximation of the relative plausibility of singletons.
(C2) favors instead the precision of such pieces of evidence. Let us compare these two approaches in two simple scenarios.
Two opposite scenarios
While C1 is (at least superficially) a sensible, rational principle (the selected proxy must be the greatest contributor to the actual classical probability transformation), C2 seems harder to justify. Why should one retain only the smallest focal elements, regardless their mass?
The attractive feature of the relative belief of singletons, among C2 approximations, is its simplicity: the original mass is directly re-distributed onto the singletons. What about the "extended" operator (27)? Now, according to criterion (C1), the best approximation (among all relative mass transormations) of bothpl b and BetP [b] is given by selecting the focal elements of size n, i.e., Θ, as the greatest contributor to both the convex sums (25) and (26) . However, it is easy to see that this yields as an approximation the average probability p(w) = 1/n, which carries no information at all. In particular, the fact that the available evidence supports to a limited extent the singletons x, y and z is completed discarded, and no decision is possible. If, on the other hand, we operate according to the criterion (C2), we end up selecting the size-2 focal elements A and B. The resulting approximation is In a decision-making sense, therefore,m 2 =b ext is the best approximation of both plausibility and pignistic transforms. We end up making the same decision, at a much lower (in general) computation cost. ) and the uniform probability on elements of B (as |B| < |A|), respectively. Therefore, it is (C1) that yields the best ap- proximation of both plausibility and pignistic transforms in a decision-making perspective.
A critical look
In the above discussion, the second scenario corresponds to a situation in which evidence is highly conflicting. In such a case we are given two opposite decision alternatives, and it is quite difficult to say which one makes more sense. Should we privilege precision or evidence support? Some insight on this issue comes from recalling that higher-size focal elements are expression of "epistemic" uncertainty (in Smets' terminology), as they come from missing data/lack of information on the problem at hand. Besides, by their own nature they allow less resolution for decision making (in the second scenario above, if we believe to the result of (C1) we are left uncertain on whether to pick one of |A| outcomes, while if we believe in (C2) the uncertainty is restricted to |B| outcomes). In conclusion, it is not irrational, in case of conflicting evidence, to judge larger size focal elements "less reliable" (as carriers of greater ignorance) than more focused focal elements. It follows a preference for the approximation criterion (C2), which ultimately supports the case for the relative belief operator and its natural extension (27) .
Conclusions
In this paper we discussed the rationale of the relative belief transform in both the probability-bound and Dempster-Shafer interpretations of belief functions. Even though neither the relative belief of singletons nor the relative plausibility of singletons are consistent with the original belief function, an interesting rationale in terms of optimal strategies in a non-cooperative game can be attached to such mappings when one assumes a belief function is a set of proba-bility distributions. We proved that relative belief commutes with Dempster's orthogonal sum, meets a number of properties which are the duals of those met by the relative plausibility of singletons, and commutes with convex closure in a similar way to Dempster's rule, supporting the argument that relative plausibility and belief transform are indeed naturally associated with the D-S framework, and highlighting a classification of probability transformations in two families. To address the issue of its limited applicability, we pointed out that relative belief is just a member of a class of relative mass transformations, which can be interpreted as low-cost proxies for both plausibility and pignistic transforms.
